Hysteria is not advisable, concern is

Without resorting to hysterical tones, I will highlight specific themes of the US National Security Strategy that raise doubts and pose future risks. While the document does not introduce a revolution here and now, it does signal future changes that could be dangerous also for Poland.

At the strategic level, the United States is moving away from the „guardian of the global order” concept. Instead of pursiung US global peacemission, it talks about calculations and the impact of a given relationship on US interests, as well as the calculation of profits and losses. It is clear that not every region or country in the world will be able to count on an active US stance in a crisis. In short, before deciding on involvement, the US will calculate whether it is profitable and what potential benefits American actions will generate. This theme itself may not be particularly significant — every country hopes to advance its own interests, including in its relations with partners. However, when combined with another theme, the situation raises concerns. The document suggests that the United States will want to change its approach to bilateral and multilateral relations and obligations to partners. It suggests that the presence of an allied country in NATO does not oblige the United States to defend it. In short, this strategy undermines NATO’s allied guarantees and will lead to NATO’s image as a reliable guarantor of assistance being weakened. It suggests that the decision to involve the United States in any crisis will depend on the pursuit of US domestic interests, not formal obligations.

This Strategy’s vision is therefore also disturbing for Poland. President Trump treats our country as a close collaborator and special partner. However, the Strategy makes no exceptions to the approach described therein. If Poland requires assistance, the document indicates that profit and loss calculations will influence decisions that affect us. Poland’s situation is relatively good at present, but the situation for smaller countries on NATO’s eastern flank seems quite difficult when this document is implemented into everyday practice. Notably, even in the section concerning the US’s strategic partner, Taiwan, the Strategy highlights the economic implications of potential Chinese aggression against the island. The document states that this would have very serious consequences for the US supply chain and economy. Implicitly, this, rather than principles, values or allied obligations, is to be the primary driver of American interests.

Adopting a transactional model of foreign policy increases the likelihood that calculations made prior to deciding on intervention, as outlined in the Strategy, will include potential losses due to tensions with other countries. This demonstrates that lost benefits from cooperating with partners who cause tension in a given region will play a much greater role in the transactional model of foreign policy than before. In short, intervention, assistance and engagement will depend not only on the impact of the crisis and its resolution on US interests, but also on the potential benefits or losses resulting from US assistance. This creates additional risks. It is too early to say for certain, but American thinking, based on the vision set out in the National Security Strategy, is moving towards a mechanism whereby whoever pays more will influence US decisions. For countries with medium and low potential, this is a very difficult and dangerous reality, especially when they are located in volatile regions.

The United States is proposing a significant rethink of its policy. It explicitly mentions a return to the Monroe Doctrine, which would mean placing a much stronger focus on Latin America. The strategy utilises the concept of the 'Western Hemisphere’, placing a strong emphasis on competition with China. There is also a clear plan to reduce engagement in Europe and the Middle East. Africa is virtually absent from this vision. Europe has been heavily criticised, primarily due to leftist ideologies undermining the potential of EU countries. As indicated, the US will cooperate with nation-states and expects Europe to make certain adjustments regarding economic and military development. A shift away from cooperation with the EU in favour of individual European countries can be expected. One of those the US wants to single out is Poland. While tensions between the US and the EU will cause political problems for Poland, this is not the main issue in the puzzle resulting from the Strategy. The Strategy’s content and lack of certain content has much more serious consequences. The US has clearly left a gap in this document with regard to Russia, its policies and its threat assessment. It is clear that the US wanted to retain the option of cooperating with Russia. In contrast, the Strategy clearly states that China is a threat and that the US intends to combat Chinese interests globally. It refers to taking action in many countries against Chinese expansion. The strategy also criticises Europe for allowing China to dominate it excessively. The situation is clear and transparent. The US views China as both a threat and a rival. It wants to combat this.

However, the arguments regarding Russia suggest otherwise. The Strategy contains no substantial analysis of Russia and its actions. There is no suggestion that Russia poses a threat or is responsible for destabilisation and chaos. Nor is there any suggestion that the US will spearhead a global strategy to counter Russian influence. However, it does suggest that the US recognises a crisis in relations between Europe and Russia, and that there is a risk of escalation which must be resolved through American diplomacy. It explicitly states that America intends to 'manage’ relations between Europe and Russia. The lack of any suggestion that Russia poses a threat, despite repeatedly attacking NATO countries, waging wars for years and constantly destabilising the US and European countries, suggests that the US is banking on a return to political and economic relations with Russia. If the US intends to 'manage’ relations between Europe and Russia, it raises questions about what these relations will look like, given that the US is offering political and economic relations with Russia. Unfortunately, there is growing concern that the US will seek to be the catalyst for a reset policy between US, Europe and Russia, following in the footsteps of the Barack Obama administration of a decade ago. These topics imply the belief that Russia can be civilised and that the US will be able to impose and enforce conditions on Russia, ensuring that American interests remain safe without making Russia taking the consequences of its aggression. However, there is reason to fear that this vision is naive and that Russia will immediately seek to exploit the US and the West and make next hostile steps towards them.

Flaws in American assumptions and decisions are also evident in their approach to Russia’s war against Ukraine. The strategy clearly indicates that the primary goal in the European theatre is to end war hostilities. In practice, this appears to entail either forcing Ukraine to accept a ceasefire or cutting off aid to Ukraine. The way the negotiations are being conducted clearly favours Russia. Russia has been on the offensive, attacking Ukraine for a long time. For Ukraine to be an equal player in these negotiations, it must first be armed and reinforced. It should be given permission to strike Russia hard with whatever means necessary and forced to receive real aid from European countries. Only then should pressure be applied to both sides to sit down at the negotiating table. Unfortunately, the current negotiations are not optimal. It seems to benefit Russia, which currently has no reason to negotiate. For many months, Russia has held a dominant position and has effectively advanced on the front. There have been no effective ways to pressure Russia imposed.

Poland is not in a bad position under the National Security Strategy. However, the assumptions described above generate risks and threats. We have specific points of reference that could enable us to improve our position in US. For example, we have been identified as a 'healthy’ democracy based on conservative values. Our rejection of the left-liberal agenda’s many absurd policies allows us to build bridges of understanding with the US. We have often been presented as a role model within NATO. However, this has not yet resulted in concrete outcomes. There is ambiguity surrounding the American presence in Poland and its future prospects. We also recognise that a country’s location on NATO’s eastern flank is not necessarily a decisive factor. US has already announced decision to reduce the US military contingent in Romania. The cuts will also affect funding for the Baltic Republics. This suggests that Poland may also have doubts about the future of American involvement in our country. It would be good if the US could present us with a concrete plan and offer.

Over the coming months and years, the new US National Security Strategy will address concrete tactical decisions and everyday issues. However, it’s already clear that a shift in American state philosophy is underway. The US is moving away from its current approach to international policy. In the new model, calculation, profits and losses, and the power game will be much more influential. This is an unfavourable prospect for NATO’s eastern flank countries, and rightly so. Since only American guarantees and commitment are credible in Russia’s eyes, our goal should be clear: to make an offer to the US that truly ties Poland’s future to American interests. The Strategy includes a provision stating that countries considered strategic partners can expect an American protective umbrella and reinforcement through military contracts with the US, as well as good bilateral relations. Poland must take advantage of this as soon as possible. However, doubts about the Strategy’s philosophy will persist until there is a guarantee that no one will be able to overpay the relations with Poland…

Stanisław Żaryn
Chairmanof the National Security Institute Foundation


*This piece is an English translation of the original Polish text.


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